LONG COURSE -- 1911-1912.

# POLICY IN ITS RELATION TO WAR.

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Policy is the "Object or course of conduct, or the principle or body of principles to be observed in conduct; specifically, the system of measures or the line of conduct which a ruler, minister, government, or party adopts and pursues as best for the interests of the country, as regards its foreign or domestic affairs; as, a spirited foreign policy; the commercial policy of the United States; a policy of peace; public policy." (Century Dictionary)

"Upon policy the whole condition, the feeling, the constitution, and the moral and physical affairs of a state depend; and upon these depend, again, the waging of war." (Von der Goltz's Conduct of War.)

Not only should the policies of an essentially democratic country be a matter of intelligent interest to all of its citizens, but they should have a general understanding at least of those policies of other nations which conflict, or are likely to conflict, with their own. In proportion as such public interest, and the control it exercises, becomes feeble, the influence of the executive officers of the government over its policies is likely to become strong, and to a certain extent individual, with a consequent tendency to instability. It is, therefore, generally recognized that in such governments continuity of design and unity of purpose can be obtained only when firmly based upon a clear understanding by the people of the main lines of both national policies and world politics, a condition which pertains most strongly in those countries whose interests or integrity are menaced by the neighborhood of powerful and antagonistic nations.

In this connection, Colonel Henderson states, in his article on "War", Encyclopedia Britanica: "The importance, nay, the necessity, that the people, as the governing body, should keep as watchful an eye on its armed forces and the national defenses as on diplomacy or legislation is fully realised, naturally enough, only by those nations whose instinct of self-preservation, by reason of the configuration of their frontiers or their political situation, are strongly developed."

As the maintenance of a nation's policies depends upon its ability to enforce them, and as insistance upon a policy may involve a nation in war, and as all the powers and means necessary to wage war, and the decision to do so, rests ultimately with the people, it follows that both they and their representatives should have a clear understanding of the grave responsibility involved in both the preparation for and the conduct of war. This is well illustrated by the following quotation from the same authority:

"The popular idea that war is a mere matter of brute force, redeemed only by valor and discipline, is responsible for a greater evil than the complacency of the amateur. It blinds the people and its representatives to their bounden duty. War is something more than a mere outgrowth of politics. It is a political act, initiated and controlled by the government, and it is an act of which the issues are far more momentous than any other. No branch of political science requires more careful study. . . . if war were more generally and more thoroughly studied, the importance of organization, of training, of education and of readiness would be more generally appreciated; abuses would no longer be regarded with lazy tolerance; efficiency would be something more than a political catchword, and soldiers would be given ample opportunity of becoming masters of every detail of

their profession. Nor is this all. A nation that understands something about war would hardly suffer the fantastic tricks which have been played so often by the best-meaning statesmen. And statesmen would realise that when war is afoot their interference is worse than useless; that preparation for defense is not the smallest of their duties; and, lastly, that so far as possible diplomacy and strategy should keep step. Each one of these is of far greater importance than in the past."

When a country has declared war for the enforcement of a policy that is opposed by another country, it has not only altered its normal relation of peaceful intercourse with that country, but has also to some extent altered its normal relations with many other nations; and since it is highly desirable that these latter suffer the least possible damage or inconvenience by reason of the necessary state of hostilities, it should be the object so to plan and so to conduct the war as least to interfere with the interests of these countries.

The purely military operations required to sustain a nation's policies will necessarily be entrusted to its military and naval authorities; but as the latter must cooperate with the political authorities in drawing up the strategic plans, and as they may at times be obliged to act upon their own initiative, it is essential that they also have a clear understanding both of their country's policies and of world politics.

As this is a point that seems not always to be well understood, or at least not sufficiently insisted upon, it may be well to illustrate it at some length by quotations from the following authorities:

"Although this branch (Diplomacy in its relation to War) is more naturally and intimately connected with the profession of a statesman than with that of a soldier, it cannot be denied that if it be useless to a subordinate general, it is indispensable to every general commanding an army; it enters into all the combinations which may lead to a war, and has a connection with the various operations to be undertaken in this war." (Jomini, "Art of War".)

"When Germany shall have finished the ships contemplated in the Naval Programme which she has formally adopted, she will have a navy much superior to that of the United States, unless we change our present rate of building, and also provide more extensive plants. Where then will be the Monroe Doctrine? and where the security of the Panama Canal? The enforcement of both these depends upon the fleet.

"The question, if merely one of military force, would be simple; the superior fleet dominates, if the margin of superiority be sufficient. It is the question of political relations which introduces perplexing factors; and the military adviser of a government is not competent to his task, unless, by knowledge of conditions, and practice in weighing them, he can fairly estimate how far inferior numbers may be reinforced by the pressure which other considerations may bring to bear on a possible enemy. Every naval officer should order his study, and his attention to contemporary events, abroad and at home, by the reflection that he may some day be on a General Staff, and in any case may beneficially affect events by his correct judgment of world-wide conditions.

"I have just stated a principle, viz, the necessity of including political -- international -- conditions in military projects. An illustration, the complement of the principle, is the contemporary historical relations of Germany and of the United States to other nations. For instance, there is the solidarity of action between Germany and Austria, just shown by the pressure of Germany upon Russia to ignore Great Britain and France, and to recognize the Austrian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. These incidents are not six months old. I cannot, of course, enter now into an elaborate analysis of all that this German action means, but I can indicate the, to us, important question involved, which is this: How far do Germany's relations with other European states permit her embarking her fleet in a trans-Atlantic adventure? If we had no fleet, doubtless she could afford to do so. If we have nine ships to her ten she probably could not so afford; because the fight we could put up, whatever the issue, would leave her without a navy to confront Europe. On the other hand, should our Pacific coast citizens precipitate us into a war, or even into seriously strained relations, with Japan, that pressure upon us would add to the force of the German fleet. In our long contention with Great Britain, based on the Monroe Doctrine, we made continuous progress up to the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty of a half dozen years ago, which registered the final triumph of the Monroe Doctrine. During all this period our navy was hopelessly inferior to the British, sometimes ludicrously so, yet we won out. Why did we? and are we in similarly good condition for a possible contention with the new Sea Power? Where ought Great Britain to stand, in case we have trouble with Germany, and where ought we to stand, in the reverse case?

"Corbett's remark is, that in the Seven Years War, the strength of the British action lay in the fact that one great man, the first Pitt, controlled the naval, the military, and the diplomatic action. The several conditions were thus weighed, and were harmonized into a common action, to which each contributed its utmost influence in mutual support. The desirability of the result must fix our eyes upon the fact that, in our country at least, it will never be attained through one man, but only by the cooperation of several. These several will be statesmen, military men, and naval men; and, in order that their cooperation may be adequate, each must understand the conditions by which the others are controlled. The often failure of conjoint military and naval operations has been due less to mean jealousy than to lack of such mutual understandings; and for a due grasp of preparation for war, and for planning war, military men of both services need to be imbued with knowledge of international relations. These relations do affect the amount of force available in various quarters, by the several opponents. Thus Darrieus says correctly: 'Every naval project which takes account neither of the foreign relations of a great nation, nor of the material limit fixed by its resources, rests upon a weak and unstable base. Foreign policy and strategy are bound together by an indestructable link;' and in this connection he quotes the German, Von der Goltz: 'Whoever writes on Strategy and Tactics ought not in his theories to neglect the point of view of his own people. He should give us a national strategy, a national tactics.' Now the Monroe Doctrine is a point of view of the American people; and no scheme of strategy -- such as the numbers and constitution of the fleet -- is sound if it neglect

this consideration. The remark applies to statesmen as well as to officers.

"My last word to you, then, in these preliminary remarks, is to master, and keep track of, the great current events in history contemporary with yourself. Appreciate their meaning. Your own profession, on its military side, calls of course for your first and closest attention; but you all will have time enough to read military history, appreciating its teachings, and you can also keep abreast of international relations, to such an extent that when you reach positions of prime responsibility, your glance, your coup d'oeil, to repeat the French idiom, will quickly take in the whole picture of your country's interests in any emergency, whether that be pressing or remote. To repeat Nelson's phrase, you will be no novice; and you will not, because, you, in your career, as he in his, will have been continually applying the judgment you are now called specially to exercise." (Mahan, War College Lectures, 1910.)

While the above advice to officers who may expect to be employed in positions of even limited national responsibility is undoubtedly sound, the same cannot be said of the limitations of knowledge to which the same author advises them to confine themselves. The same quotation continues:

"That you may more effectually do this ('master the great current events in history contemporary with yourself') banish from your mind all concern about questions interior to the country; questions financial, sociological, economical, or what not. The sphere of the Navy is international solely; and it is this which allies it so closely to that of the statesman. Be yourselves statesmen as well

as seamen." (Mahan, War College Lectures, 1910.)

This is in conflict with the author's own advice, embodied in the above quotation, that "Every naval officer should order his study and his attention to contemporary events, abroad and at home by the reflection that he may some day be on a general staff, and in any case may beneficially affect events by his correct judgment of world-wide conditions."

It would seem that an officer would not be likely to exercise a very beneficial influence upon the deliberations of his government if, as a member of a general staff, he "banished from his mind all concern about questions interior to the country; questions financial, sociological, economical, or what not;" since these, particularly questions of finance, economy, etc., and their influence upon public opinion, must necessarily exercise a decidedly limiting influence upon governmental action; and certainly an officer who did not know anything about the sociological conditions of his own country, or the permanent or temporary attitude of his countrymen of various races toward the country or countries opposing the policy in dispute, would not be a very useful counselor in time of trouble.

The most essential requirement of a statesman is that he thoroughly understands the aims, desires, temper, moral state and material resources of his own country, otherwise he could not safely or intelligently guide it in its relations with other countries. We are advised to "Be statesmen as well as seamen". We cannot be the former if we banish from our minds all concern regarding any important questions interior to our own country.

Darrieus says, in "War on the Sea," that we require "Knowledge of the enemy, of his weak points as well as the

resources at his disposal, of his moral state as well as of his material situation; in short all the information the utilization of which is the most valuable element in success."

If in order to exercise sound judgment we must be informed of the moral state as well as the material situation of the enemy's country, it would seem at least desirable that we should consider the same valuable elements of success in relation to the other party to the war, that is, our own country.

The Military Correspondent of the London Times states in "The Foundations of Reform": "Many other departments besides the Admiralty and the War Offices will be concerned in a great war, notably the Exchequer, the Foreign, Colonial and Indian Offices, and the Board of Trade. The mission of each one of these departments should be defined in advance to meet the case of at least one great war."

Manifestly a naval officer would not be of much use, as a member of a general staff, in helping to define the mission of each one of these domestic departments if he had closed his mind to all such considerations relating to his own country.

Though the policies of a nation whose government is essentially democratic must ultimately be determined by, or approved by, the people, their enforcement is entrusted to the representatives of the people -- the head of the state and his civil and military advisers, and the legislative representatives, acting for and responsive to the will of the people. This necessarily involves responsibility for the preparation for defense and for the creation of the means necessary to enforce the policies and conserve the national interests.

Briefly stated, the relative responsibility is as follows:

1. The people are ultimately responsible for the policies which they require their representatives to carry out.

2. The executive officials of the government are responsible to the people for the initiation of the preparations necessary to enforce these policies, and for their enforcement in case of necessity.

3. The naval and military authorities are responsible for their advice as to the means necessary for sustaining the policies, and for the efficient employment of these means in war.

4. The legislative representatives of the people are responsible for providing the means recommended by the officials of the government, political and military. They alone hold the purse strings and can grant or refuse the necessary appropriations.

The naval and military authorities advise as to the means. The head of the state, exercising both political and military authority, recommends their provision by the legislative branch, which latter decides whether or not the recommendations shall be approved, and has sole authority as to the appropriation of funds. Thus the final responsibility, in case inadequate means should oblige the government to abandon a policy, would rest with the legislative branch.

A policy that could not be imposed by actual force, or the existence of potential force, would not be too strongly insisted upon. If the enforcement of a policy is considered wholly essential, either because it is of vital

importance to the integrity of the country, or because it is strongly believed in by the people, even for insufficient or sentimental reasons, and if the military forces are not sufficient to sustain it against the will of those nations that oppose it seriously, it becomes the duty of the custodians of our policies, after consultation with the military authorities, to determine the augmentation of forces that are necessary, and recommend them for the consideration of the legislative representatives who, guided necessarily very largely by public opinion, will either appropriate for and order the necessary preparations made, or decline to do so, and thus oblige the government to modify or abandon the policy.

All responsibility should be definitely fixed:

1. For the decision as to the policies the government will sustain.

2. For the recommendations concerning the forces necessary to maintain the country's policies.

3. For the appropriations necessary to the creation of the armed forces required.

4. For the efficient use of the forces in war.

In order that a country may successfully maintain a certain policy, it must be prepared, not only with the necessary forces, but with a strategic plan of campaign based upon the policy and its relation to world politics, and upon the existing military conditions. As these considerations involve an intimate knowledge of domestic and world politics, of the influence of the policy to be enforced and of the nature of the resultant war upon other nations, as well as of a thorough knowledge of naval and military strategy, it follows that no man or special class of men can

hope unaided to reach the best possible solution. This can be accomplished only by a logical co-ordination of the several branches of knowledge involved -- political (both international and domestic), military and naval.

The responsibility for this co-ordination rests with the head of the state, and upon its efficiency may depend the integrity of the state -- its position in the world of nations and, in case of serious war, perhaps its very existence.

This principle of the necessity for the co-ordination of the various branches of knowledge and experience required efficiently to prepare a nation to sustain its policies, or to wage war to enforce them, is insisted upon by many authoritative writers upon war and Policy.

In"War on the Sea", Darrieus points out "the intimate connection which makes military conceptions the natural consequence of political conceptions. There is no study of strategy possible without that. It has become a common saying that 'A nation must have the fleet which corresponds to its policy.'"

"It is indispensable that the authority charged with the control of our foreign policies have a perfect understanding of the capacity of the army and of the navy. The progress of our foreign policy must be governed by the worth of our naval and military resources. We are not free to choose 'a priori' our friends and adversaries on the day when these compel us to engage in war; we must know if these are such as to assure to us the elements of success or defeat." ("Doctrine of National Defense,"Captain Serb, French Navy.)

"Under this head (Statesmanship in its relation to War) are included those considerations from which a states-

man concludes whether a war is proper, opportune, or indispensable, and determines the various operations necessary to attain the object of the War.

"War is always to be conducted according to the great principles of the art; but great discretion must be exercised in the nature of the operations to be undertaken, which should depend upon the circumstances of the case." (Jomini, "The Art of War.")

"War serves politics both before and after. War waged only for annihilation and destruction is in these days inconceivable. An end and aim that is of permanent value to the state, be it only a question of ascendancy, must be existent; and this can only arise from political considerations.

"The object of a war is of such importance and will be of such lasting effect upon the exertions which nations make to attain it, that we ought, almost on that account alone, to place policy first among conditions of success. Now, as we have here pointed out, many motives are also attendant, and thus we may without hesitation lay down a maxim that without a good policy a successful war is not probable." (Von der Goltz, "Conduct of War.")

The supreme policy of every great state is the preservation of its national independence. Where this is not guaranteed by the mutual jealousies of other states, it must be maintained by the potential or actual use of an adequate military force. The minimum requirement of governmental efficiency is the ability to guarantee the nation's integrity, and this depends upon the efficient co-ordination of the political and military direction and the resolution and energy with which the resulting forces, both moral and physical, are applied in furthering the just aims of the state.

The essential relation and interdependence of the political and military authorities is illustrated by the following quotations:

"The Emperor unites the supreme military and the supreme political control. This combination is intended to secure the first of all conditions of success in war, harmony between the political and the military direction. It is impossible to overrate the importance of accord between strategy and policy. The soldier is at all times the servant of the statesman; a relationship the loyal recognition of which implies that the soldier abstains from prescribing ends to the statesman, the statesman from interfering with the soldier in the choice of means. An exhaustive discussion of the relations between the army and the government -- that is, between war and policy -- lies beyond the scope of this work. But it is relevant to say that the successful conduct of a state in war, as in peace, depends very largely upon the clearness with which the sovereign power conceives its political ends, and the resolution with which they are pursued. No perfection of military organization can compensate for the failure of the statesman to frame a clear conception of his aims, or for the timidity or hesitation in the effort to attain them.

"The placing of an army on a war footing and its transport to a frontier are political acts of the gravest moment. They are therefore usually controlled almost as much by political as by military considerations, and it is impossible rightly to appreciate them without taking into account the political circumstances by which they are affected." (Wilkinson, "The Brain of an Army.")

"It belongs to the national authorities alone to give the initial impulse, to establish what may be called the

programme of future hostilities, but if one makes war, of his own accord or because he is forced to, it matters not which, he must know how to make it; once the war has begun, its direction belongs to the military chief. Every other method leads straight to defeat, and if all the conquests of modern progress in the matter of rapidity of communications are to have for a consequence the restraint of the indispensable initiative of the supreme commander in the field, all the benefits which they confer will not be sufficient to make up for their evil effects." (Darrieus, "War on the Sea.")

"Suffren felt the full value of military independence when he wrote the Minister, de Castries: 'The king can be well served in these far off countries only when those in command have great powers and the courage to use them.'

"This Minister wrote to him: 'The king has announced to you in your instructions, sir, that all courageous acts which his generals may do, even though they fail of the success which their boldness deserves, will be none the less honored of him, and that inaction is the only thing with which he will be displeased.'" (Darrieus, "War on the Sea.")

"The task of the commanders of the army is to annihilate the hostile forces; the object of war is to conquer peace under conditions which are conformable to the policy pursued by the state. To fix and limit the objects to be attained by the war, and to advise the monarch in respect to them is and remains, during the war just as before it, a political function, and the manner in which these questions are solved cannot be without influence on the method of conducting the war. The ways and means of the latter will always depend upon whether the result finally obtained is the one desired, or more or less; whether cessions of

territory are to be demanded or forborne, and whether temporary occupation is required, and for how long." (Bismarck, "The Man and the Statesman.")

"In practice, however, it is often difficult to reconcile military with political considerations. Thus in 1866 the success of von Moltke's plan was seriously endangered by the delay which was forced on him, for political reasons, by the Prussian Government. In 1870 the disaster of Sedan was caused by the French government insisting, for political reasons, on MacMahon's movement towards Metz. In war ultimate political success must depend on military success, and the policy which insists on unsound military measures is likely to defeat its own ends. On the other hand, in framing a plan of campaign a general must make full allowance for political exigencies. The failure of McClellan's operations in 1862 is a warning of the danger a general incurs when he attempts to carry out a plan to which his government accords only a half-hearted support." (Hamley's "Operations of War.")

"It would appear, then, that while a statesman may be competent to appreciate the general principles of the projects of operations laid before him, he should never attempt to frame a project for himself. Still less, when once he has approved of a plan of campaign, should he attempt to limit the number of troops to be employed, or to assign the position of the necessary detachments. Nevertheless, a knowledge of war may still be exceedingly useful to him. A minister of war cannot divest himself of his responsibility for the conduct of military operations. In the first place, he is directly responsible for plans of campaign to meet every possible contingency being worked out in time of peace. In the second place, he is directly responsible for the advice on which he acts being the best

procurable. It is essential, therefore, that he should be capable of forming an independent opinion on the merits of the military projects which may be submitted to him, and also on the merits of those who have to execute them." (Col. Henderson, "The Science of War.")

"The necessity is therefore evident for the intimate coordination between the directing organs of foreign relations and army and navy. Confronted by foreign powers, we must not embark on new ventures, engage in new negotiations without having beforehand carefully considered all the military consequences of a new policy, and without having looked carefully into what we actually shall be able to do, either alone, or with the aid of allied forces. If the projected combination will lead us some day into armed conflict, the Minister of Foreign Affairs must consult the competent authorities of the army and of the navy in order that they may examine together new 'concrete cases' which they may be led to consider, after which, he can arrive at a decision fully cognizant of his course of action.

"In thus dealing with this matter we will avoid dangerous combinations and the possibility of being some day forced to the dire necessity of making concessions and of taking retrograde steps which tend to lower our self respect, and be detrimental to our interests and to our standing among the nations." (Doctrine of National Defense", Captain Serb, French Navy.)

"In 1866 and 1870 the German press was so carefully muzzled that, even had there been occasion, it could have done nothing to prejudice public opinion. Thus both the sovereign and the generals were backed by the popular support they so richly merited; but, it may be remarked, the relations between the army and the government were characterised by a harmony which has been seldom seen. The

old King, in his dual capacity as head of the state and commander-in-chief, had the last word to say, not only in the selection of the superior officers, but in approving every important operation. With an adviser like Moltke at his elbow, it might appear that these were mere matters of form. Moltke, however, assures us that the King was by no means a figurehead. Although most careful not to assert his authority in a way that would embarrass his chief of staff, and always ready to yield his own judgment to sound reasons, he expressed, nevertheless, a perfectly independent opinion on every proposal placed before him, and on very many occasions made most useful suggestions. At the same time, while systematically refraining from all interference after operations had begun, he never permitted military considerations to override the demands of policy." (Col. Henderson, "The Science of War.")

While a government must insist upon the supreme policy of national integrity, or cease to remain wholly independent, it may initiate and apply a policy which is of such minor importance that neither the country benefitted by it nor those to whose interests it is opposed would consider it advantageous to go to war in support of their rival claims, considering that in many cases even complete success in war often imposes heavy burdens upon the victor in the way of disruption of trade, loss of national forces, etc.

Also, a country may under certain circumstances initiate an important policy and continuously maintain it even against nations possessing an overwhelming superiority of forces, but which they refrain from using, not because of the probability of defeat, but because even complete success in the attainment of the immediate object might entail disadvantages that outweigh them.

Generally speaking, the justice of a policy and its

general acceptance as such by other nations, exercises a considerable, though by no means always decisive, deterrent influence upon nations opposed to it and having the power to enforce their will against the state advocating it.

In other cases, the necessity for maintaining the balance of power sometimes permits the maintenance of a policy which is contrary to the interests of a nation, or a combination of nations, having sufficient force successfully to oppose it.

To give reliable examples, whether actual or suppositious, in illustration of the above, and, particularly, fully to explain the governing influences in each case, would require the most complete knowledge possible, at least of the world politics and the principal policies of all important nations, not to mention the experience and ability necessary correctly to estimate their interrelation and the moral support they would be likely to receive from the various peoples concerned. But the complicated web of political influences, and the inadequacy of political decisions based upon the consideration of an isolated policy, may be sufficiently illustrated by the following examples:

1. In the Venezuela affair, the Monroe Doctrine was maintained against the declared interests of Great Britain at a time when the United States navy was relatively wholly inconsiderable. Great Britain could have imposed her wishes in the matter, but was probably deterred by a consideration of the ulterior consequences of the war that would have resulted. The Monroe Doctrine was adopted upon the initiative, or suggestion, of Great Britain, and therefore she probable could not have repudiated it without losing the sympathy of other powers. War with the United States would have resulted in a serious disruption of her over-sea trade, particularly her supplies of food stuff, and of cotton and

other raw materials of manufacture. It would also have meant the forfeiture of Great Britain's amicable relations with the United States, which were then of much importance, and which, by reason of the increasing power of her neighbors, will probably be of much greater -- perhaps vital -- importance in the future.

2. Germany, in the application of her policy of colonial expansion, is assumed to have decided in the Morrocco affair to use force in opposition to France, but apparently miscalculated the probable intensity of the opposition of the British government and the unanimous support of its people, and was forced in consequence to abandon Agadir and compromise her differences with France.

3. Colonial expansion is the declared policy of Germany, France and Italy. South America is the most promising field. Exploitation in this field is opposed by the terms of the Monroe Doctrine. A combination of the three powers could doubtless enforce their wishes against the opposition of the United States, at least for a number of years. As a preliminary step they could seize the Cape de Verde Islands against the inconsiderable opposition of Spain, but this act alone would doubtless precipitate war with Great Britain.

4. As a measure of strategic protection, it would be advantageous for the United States to establish a strong base in the Cape de Verde Islands, and though this could not be successfully opposed by Spain, there can be little doubt that it would be opposed by Great Britain and other European powers.

The above examples are intended simply to illustrate that "The various decisions which a government is called

upon to take are not shut off from one another into water-tight compartments; they are all intimately connected, and in the relation between them is to be sought the continuity of design or unity of purpose which are so many names for a policy." (Wilkinson's "War and Policy," p.8

It is clear, therefore, that the political acts resulting from a country's policies, the preparation of the means necessary to enforce the policies, the strategic plans necessary to render the means effective, and the probable influence of the proposed use of force upon the affairs of all interested nations, are all so intimately associated that neither the political nor the military authorities of a government are alone capable of deciding both the political acts and the strategic plans; nor are either even capable of deciding the questions relating to their own speciality, without at least a sound general knowledge of the main principles of the speciality of the others. That is, the statesmen should have an adequate knowledge of the nature of war, and the military men who are charged with the making and the executing of the strategic plans should be well informed as to world politics and the mutual relations between the policies of their own country and those of the countries concerned.

When this degree of knowledge exists in the two classes of officials -- the statesmen and the military authorities -- joint discussion between the two should produce the most successful strategic plans that the government is capable of formulating -- plans embodying a combination of the maximum political and military knowledge and experience.

If such plans are supported by all of the resources that the nation can afford, and are resolutely backed by the moral support of the people, it may then be said that

the government is exerting its maximum power, intellectual, moral and physical.

Thus we see that the exertion of a nation's whole power depends upon a combination of statesmen who understand war, of military men who understand world politics, and of a population that understands both of these elements sufficiently well to realize the imperative necessity of giving their representatives their maximum moral support, independent of party politics.

In the above discussion of the general principles governing war and policy and the means of deciding upon the plans for the enforcement of the latter by the former, it has been assumed that when the political and military authorities enter upon their joint discussion, they are each in possession of all of the information relating to their own country which may exercise a limiting influence upon their political and military decision and the resulting strategic plans. As a matter of fact, however, some of this information is of such a variable and complicated character that neither of the two classes of officials mentioned could be expected at all times to have a sufficiently accurate knowledge thereof, particularly where the information may be of such a nature that its relative influence might frequently vary, both before the declaration of war and during its progress. This is especially the case in regard to the finances of a country -- the fluctuations of credit and in the value of currency, as, for example, during the civil war. This influence is felt in the case of almost all wars, and plans that are drawn up in preparation for possible war must not only be duly limited by financial considerations, but may have to be materially modified in this respect as a result of the mere declaration of war, not to mention the influence of acts of war, and their success or failure, upon the

national credit.

"Strategy cannot move altogether untrammeled by politics and finance. But political and financial considerations may not present themselves in quite the same light to the soldier as to the statesman, and the latter is bound to make certain that they have received due attention." (Col. Henderson's article on "War".)

It is hardly necessary to state that in the co-operation of political and military officials in the formulation of strategic plans for the enforcement of a policy, the purely military part of the plans should be the result of a co-ordination between the authorities of the army and navy -- where both are to be employed. These military men should be held responsible only for the soundness of their recommendations regarding the means necessary to wage successful war and, once war is declared, for the efficient use of these means in furthering the aims of the policy, and in safeguarding such other policies as are related thereto or which the incidents of the war bring under consideration.

The whole conduct of war should therefore be based upon plans the strategic objective of which is to gain the definite aims of the policy involved; and such plans can be intelligently based only upon a thorough comprehension of the whole history of the policy, its bearing upon the policies of the nation with which we are in controversy, the bearing of the war upon the policies of other nations, and the terms of the treaty that is desirable in making peace.

In this connection, it may be well to accentuate the fact that in arriving at a decision to declare war, and in formulating the strategic plans necessary to enforce our demands, due consideration must be given to the influence

which the war and the desired terms of peace may exercise upon the policies and interests of other nations.

This is illustrated by the following quotations:

"The influence of third Powers, too, must not be lost sight of. It frequently determines how far the victor may proceed in his demands, and how far and to what extent the vanquished must give way.

"Upon policy the whole condition, the feeling, the constitution, and the moral and physical affairs of a state depend; and upon these depend, again, the waging of war.

"Policy, again, regulates the relation not merely of these States immediately concerned, but also those of such as are indirectly interested in the final issue. Their favour or disfavour may be of very great significance, impeding the course of events, or promoting them. Politics, again, as a rule, determine the moment for the outbreak of hostilities, upon the happy choice of which much depends. They, in short, create the general situation, in which the State enters into the struggle, and this will be of material influence upon the decisions and attitude of the commander-in-chief, and even upon the general esprit of the army." (Von der Goltz, "Conduct of War.")

As regards the formation of a policy, theoretically, and sometimes actually, it is initiated by the representatives of the people. Usually, however, the initiation is preceded by a gradual formation of opinion, based upon public discussion of the interests involved. An important policy thus in an advanced stage of formation cannot be prematurely announced ("Initiated"), or its announcement unduly withheld, by the government without serious opposition on the part of the electorate. The announcement is,

therefore, usually the result of a reasonable certainty of public approval, generally determined by the nature of the acceptance of a proposition put forth unofficially in the press, and commonly called a "Ballon d'essai." feeler

In any case, however, whether or not a policy was initiated by public discussion of the interests involved, or whether it was proposed by the Government and accepted by public opinion, the force of the obligation it imposes upon other nations must finally depend upon the moral support of the people. Upon this must necessarily depend the continuity of the policy, the preparations made to support it and the intensity of the war that could be waged to maintain it.

The more nearly a policy is, or is believed to be, vital to the political existence of a nation, the more naturally and thoroughly will it be supported by public opinion. For example, it is universally recognised that the integrity of the British Empire depends upon the policy of maintaining its fleet at sufficient strength to gain and keep control of the sea in any conflict in which it is likely to be engaged, and the appropriations deemed necessary by the government are always voted without serious political opposition; and upon occasions where the maritime supremacy is believed to be seriously menaced, all political parties unite in support of the measures necessary to enforce the policy.

The declaration of, or insistance upon, a policy is usually the cause of war. Such a war is necessarily waged to enforce the policy, and, if successful, the treaty of peace provides for its maintenance.

Though policies usually originate with, and must ultimately be sustained by, the people, it is their

representatives who are responsible for their application in the conduct of the affairs of the government, and who, with the moral support of the people, enforce them when necessary; but above and beyond the decision to declare war for the enforcement of a policy, is the decision as to the nature, that is, the extent and intensity, of the war that the maintenance of the policy will require. The object of the war, which is usually political, must necessarily be the governing factor, and this taken in connection with the means available will govern in determining the military objectives and the nature of the war in general. The importance of a thorough understanding of the influence governing the true aim of the military forces and the extent to which these aims should be pursued is strongly insisted upon by Clausewitz, On War:

"Here the question which we had laid aside forces itself again into consideration, viz, the political object of the war. The law of the extreme, the view to disarm the adversary, to overthrow him, has hitherto to a certain extent usurped the place of this end or object. Just as this law loses its force, the political object must again come forward. If the whole consideration is a calculation of probability based on definite persons and relations, then the political object, being the original motive, must be an essential factor in the product.

"Thus, therefore, the political object, as the original motive of the War, will be the standard for determining both the aim of the military force and also the amount of effort to be made.

"Now, if we reflect that war has its root in a political object, then naturally this original motive

which called it into existence should also continue the first and highest consideration in its conduct. Still, the political object is no despotic lawgiver on that account; it must accommodate itself to the nature of the means, and though changes in these means may involve modification in the political objective, the latter always retains a prior right to consideration. Policy, therefore, is interwoven with the whole action of war, and must exercise a continuous influence upon it, as far as the nature of the forces liberated by it will permit.

"We see, therefore, that war is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means. All beyond this which is strictly peculiar to war relates merely to the peculiar nature of the means which it uses. That the tendencies and views of policy shall not be incompatible with these means, the Art of War in general and the Commander in each particular case may demand, and this claim is truly not a trifling one. But however powerfully this may re-act on political views in particular cases, still it must always be regarded as only a modification of them; for the political view is the object, War is the means, and the means must always include the object in our conception.

"We see, therefore, in the first place, that under all circumstances War is to be regarded not as an independent thing, but as a political instrument; and it is only by taking this point of view that we can avoid finding ourselves in opposition to all military history. This is the only means of unlocking the

great book and making it intelligible. Secondly, this view shows us how Wars must differ in character according to the nature of the motives and circumstances from which they proceed.

"Now, the first, the grandest, and most decisive act of judgment which the Statesman and General exercise is rightly to understand in this respect the War in which he engages, not to take it for something, or to wish to make of it something, which by the nature of its relations it is impossible for it to be. This is, therefore, the first, the most comprehensive, of all strategical questions." (Clausewitz, On War.)

The importance of extensive and accurate knowledge of the political conditions of all of the powers with which a country has more or less extensive relations, particularly when it is a question of waging war or making peace, is accentuated by Bismarck, in "The Man and the Statesman," and also by Von Caemmerer, as follows:

"Still more difficult in the same line is it to judge whether and with what motives other Powers might be inclined to assist the adversary, in the first instance diplomatically, and eventually by armed force; what prospect the rpresentatives of such a combination have of obtaining their object in foreign courts; how the parties would group themselves if it came to conferences or to a congress; and whether there is danger of further wars being developed from the intervention of neutrals. But above all is the difficulty of deciding when the right moment has come for introducing the transition from war to peace; for this pur-

pose are needed knowledge of the European conditions, which is not apt to be familiar to the military element, and information which cannot be accessible to it. The question of war or peace always belongs, even in war, to the responsible political minister, and cannot be decided by the technical military leaders. But the minister concerned can only give the King expert advice, if he possesses a knowledge of the actual position at any moment and of the views of those who conduct the War." (Bismarck, "The Man and the Statesman.")

"War therefore derives its form chiefly from the mode of international intercourse which we call politics; war is a political instrument, 'and it is only by taking this point of view that we can avoid finding ourselves in opposition to all military history. This is the only means of unlocking the great book and making it intelligible.' (Clausewitz.) Because this is so, wars must absolutely differ according to the nature of their motives and the circumstances of their origin.

"'Now the first, the grandest, and most decisive act of judgment which the statesman and general exercises is rightly to understand in this respect the war in which he engages, not to take it for something or to wish to make of it something which, by the nature of its relations it is impossible for it to be. This is, therefore, the first, the most comprehensive of all strategical questions.' (Clausewitz.)

"In one word, the art of war in its highest point of view is policy, but, no doubt, a policy which fights battles instead of writing notes. According to this view, to leave a great military enterprise, or the